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Abstract
We derive an optimal strategy in the popular Deal or No Deal game show. Q-learning
quantifies the continuation value inherent in sequential decision making and we use
this to analyze contestants risky choices. Given their choices and optimal strategy,
we invert to find implied bounds on their levels of risk aversion. In risky decision
making, previous empirical evidence has suggested that past outcomes affect future
choices and that contestants have time-varying risk aversion. We demonstrate that
the strategies of two players (Suzanne and Frank) from the European version of the
game are consistent with constant risk aversion levels except for their last risk-seeking
choice.
1 Introduction
Ever since the introduction of the popular television show Deal or No Deal, many au-
thors have analyzed aspects of the game. Deal or No Deal provides an ‘experiment’ with
large stakes and a relatively simple probabilistic structure. Using Q-learning (Watkins,
1989, Whittle, 1982, Putterman, 1984, Polson and Sorensen, 2011) we address the ques-
tion of optimal strategy. Our solution technique provides a dynamic maximum expected
utility solution (Ramsey, 1926, de Finetti, 1937, von Neumann and Mortgensen, 1944). Q-
learning is a popular reinforcement learning technique for calculating continuation values
for sequential decision making.
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IL 60637. Polson is Professor of Econometrics and Statistics at the Booth School of Business, University
of Chicago, 5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue Chicago, IL 60637. Emails [lkorsos,ngp]@chicagobooth.edu
1
In Deal or No Deal contestants are presented with a simple decision of whether to take
a Banker’s offer or to continue in the game. Hence the value realized from deciding to
decline the banker’s offer - ‘No Deal’ - has a continuation value, a stylized fact of sequential
decision making. Previous empirical evidence has suggested that past outcomes affect
future choices and that contestants have time-varying risk aversion. One key feature of
continuation values is that they can appear to lead to the same effect – namely current
actions appearing to exhibit time-varying risk aversion – when in fact it is no more than an
optimal action to exercise the continuation value of the game. To illustrate these effects,
we consider a simple scenario with logarithmic utility. This also illustrates a theoretical
rule of thumb in Deal or No Deal : one should generally continue as long as there are two
big prizes left.
We analyze data from two players, Frank and Suzanne, from the European version of
the game show (Post et al, 2008). Tables 1 and 2 provide the contestants choices. For
example, in round seven, after several unlucky picks, Frank opened the briefcase with the
last remaining large prize (e500,000) and saw his expected prize tumble from e102,006
to e2,508. The banker offered him e2,400 but Frank rejected the offer and continued to
play. He finally ended up with a briefcase with only e10. In round nine, he even rejected
a certain e6,000 in favor of a 50/50 gamble of e10 or e10,000 – clearly exhibiting risk
seeking behavior.
In contrast, Suzanne was a “lucky” player. In round nine see faced a 50/50 gamble of
e100,000 or e150,000 (two of the three largest prizes in the German edition). While she
was hesitant in the earlier rounds, she rejected the banker’s offer of e125,000 – the expected
payoff – and finally won the e150,000 prize. Our analysis will track their choices and infer
bounds on their levels of risk aversion at each stage. We provide a separate analysis of the
last stage of the game, as both players exhibit risk seeking behavior here. Other authors
claim declining risk aversion of individuals after earlier expectations have been shattered
by unfavorable outcomes. Our approach shows that the continuation value is in fact high
and therefore risk aversion of contestants need not decline in the aforementioned case.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the Q-Learning
technique and how it is applied to the Deal or No Deal game, including log and power
utility examples. Section 3 solves for optimal strategy using Q-learning. Given an optimal
strategy and the contestants empirical choices, we can then infer bounds on their risk
aversion. We also analyze their terminal risk-seeking choices. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2
2 Q-Learning and Deal-No Deal
2.1 Deal or No Deal
In the game Deal or No Deal, players are presented with a choice of briefcases which hold
distinct monetary prize values. Initially, players are asked to select one case, which will be
referred to as ‘their case’ and remain unopened. Then, they proceed by choosing, and thus
eliminating a predetermined number of cases each round. The values of these eliminated
cases are shown to the player. At the end of each set of case eliminations, an entity referred
to as ‘The Banker’ then presents the player with a monetary offer in exchange for their
case. At this point, the player is given two options: either take the Banker’s offer (i.e.
Deal) or continue eliminating cases (i.e. No Deal). The game continues until an offer is
accepted or there is only one case remaining.
From this setup, we can decompose the game into a set of states. Let the set V contain
all the possible prize values in the initial suitcases. Let the set S consist of all possible
combinations of prize values from the given set of possible prize values V . Let, s ∈ S be
one of the sets of possible remaining suitcase prize values. At each state s, the player is
given a set of possible actions A, defined as follows:
A = {0, 1} = {‘No Deal’, ‘Deal’}
After performing an action a ∈ A, the player then experiences a transition from state to
state. We define the payoff to the player as a state-action map onto the space of real
numbers: Q : S × A → R. The goal is simply to maximize the discounted resulting value
of this mapping. Q-Learning allows us to maximize utility over a set of possible decisions,
providing a map of the optimal path of actions.
2.2 Optimal Strategy: Q-Learning
In this subsection, we describe the basic ingredients of Q-learning. First, we let the agent’s
immediate utility, taking the ‘Deal’, be denoted by u(st, at). The Bellman principle of op-
timality states that the optimal solution path a⋆(s) is the solution to the Bellman equation
defined by a value function V (s) that satisfies
V (s) = max
a′
{
u(s, a′) +
∑
s′
V (s′) p(s′|s, a′)
}
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Here p(s′|s, a′) is the transition matrix throughout states given action a′. In Deal or No
Deal, actions cannot affect the state’s evolution, so we write p(s′|s). Rather than directly
computing the value function, we instead calculate the matrix of Q-values. They are defined
as the total expected utility gained by choosing a current action a and following the optimal
path thereafter.
An optimal policy must satisfy Bellman’s principle of optimality: that an optimal path
has the property that whatever the initial conditions and control variables (choices) over
some initial period, the control (or decision variables) chosen over the remaining period
must be optimal for the remaining problem, with the state resulting from the early decisions
taken to be the initial condition.
To solve for this, we need a transition matrix for probabilities, a utility function and
a banker’s valuation function. To fix notation, let s ∈ S denote the current state of the
system and a ∈ A an action. Define the Q-value, Qt(s, a), at time t by the value of using
action a today and then proceeding optimally in the future. The Bellman equation for
Q-values becomes:
Qt(s, a) = u(s, a) +
∑
s⋆∈S⋆
P (s⋆|s, a)max
a∈A
Qt+1(s
⋆, a)
where S⋆ ⊂ S is the set of all possible next period states given the current action a, namely
S⋆ = {s⋆ : s⋆ ∈ P(s) ∩ |s⋆| = |s| − 1}. The value function and optimal action are then
simply given by:
V (s) = max
a∈A
Q(s, a) and a⋆(s) = argmax
a∈A
Q(s, a)
In our discrete setting, we can directly find the Q-values without resorting to the sim-
ple stochastic approximation algorithms given in Watkins (1989) and Watkins and Dayan
(1992). We now define the ingredients to solve the problem:
Transition Matrix. Since there is equal probability that a player chooses any of the
existing prize values, we define the transition probabilities as follows:
P (s⋆|s, a = 1) =
1
|S⋆|
=
1
|s|
For example, when you have three prizes left, with s the current state
S⋆ = {all subsets of two prizes} and P (s⋆|s, a = 1) =
1
3
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where the transition matrix is uniform to the next state.
There is no continuation value for taking the Deal. If action a = 0 is chosen, then the
value realized by the player is either the utility of the offer presented by the banker
or the utility of the value of the player’s case (if no other cases remain).
Banker’s Function B(s). There are a number of different choices for modeling the banker’s
function. In the live TV show one only sees the current banker offer and of course,
to address the issue of optimal policy and the continuation value we need to know
what they would offer in future states of the world. One popular choice is expected
value: let v ∈ S be a possible prize, then
B(s) = s¯ ≡
1
|s|
∑
v∈s
v
where s is the set of the remaining prize values. Another choice is from the on-
line version of the game where the website (www.nbc.com/DealOrNoDeal) uses the
following criteria: let big and small denote the biggest and smallest prizes left on the
board, respectively. Then, the banker offer is given by
• With 3 prizes left: B(s) = 0.305 · big + 0.5 · small
• With 2 prizes left: B(s) = 0.355 · big + 0.5 · small.
This is not the case in the TV show as the Banker has some discretion on the offer.
Empirically, it almost strictly holds that: B(s) < s¯ – the expected value of the
remaining prizes.
Utility. The utility of the next state depends on the contestant’s value for money and the
bidding function B(s) of the banker. For example, in the case of CRRA power utility
u(B(s)) =
B(s)1−γ − 1
1− γ
with log-utility u(B(s)) = ln(B(s)) a special case. A more flexible choice is the
exponential-power utility function
u(B(s)) = α−1
(
1− exp
(
−α(W +B(s))1−γ
))
where W is current wealth. For the purpose of our analysis, we focus on the natural
logarithm and CRRA cases.
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2.3 Illustrative Example: Log-Utility
To show that the continuation value can be large we consider an example where there
are three prizes left including two large ones, s = {750, 500, 25}. Let us take an example
where the contestant is risk averse with log-utility: u(x) = ln x. This is equivalent to the
well-known Kelly (1956) criterion. The contestant would be indifferent to a coin toss that
doubled or halved their wealth.
For a base case analysis, suppose that the Banker’s offers are determined by the expected
value of the prizes left in the set s. With log-utility this will look like a good deal in a
one-shot version of the game. For this example, the utility of the offer is
u(B(s = {750, 500, 25})) = ln(1275/3) = 6.052
Taking the deal leads to a utility Qt(s, a = 0) = 6.052.
However, we have to compare this to the continuation problem (‘No Deal’). The set of
future possible states is S⋆ = {s⋆1, s
⋆
2, s
⋆
3} where
s⋆1 = {750, 500} , s
⋆
2 = {750, 25} , s
⋆
3 = {500, 25}
As the banker offers the expected value, if the contestant picks ‘No Deal’ we will have offers
of 625, 387.5, and 137.5, respectively. This gives the following Q-value calculation:
Qt(s, a = 1) =
∑
s⋆∈S⋆
P (s⋆|s, a = 1)max
a∈A
Qt+1(s
⋆, a)
=
1
3
(ln(625) + ln(387.5) + ln(262.5)) = 5.989
with immediate utility given by u(s, a) = 0.
Therefore, as Qt(s, a = 1) = 5.989 < 6.052 = Qt(s, a = 0) the optimal action for the
player at time t is a⋆ = 0, ‘Deal’. We see that the continuation value was not large enough
to overcome the generous (expected value) offer by the banker.
This analysis also illustrates the rule-of-thumb that most players should proceed as long
as there are two large prizes left as the continuation value is high.
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis - Different Banker’s Function
The magnitude of the continuation value is related to the Banker’s bidding function. If we
now use the Banker’s bidding function provided by the on-line game, defined by:
B(s) = 0.355 · big + 0.5 · small (with two prizes remaining)
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Hence, we can evaluate the banker’s function at each of the s∗ next period states:
B(s⋆1 = {750, 500}) = 516.25
B(s⋆2 = {750, 25}) = 278.75
B(s⋆3 = {500, 25}) = 190
Using these, let us consider the optimal action with 2 prize values left for the player. To
do so, we calculate the following Q-values:
Qt+1(s
⋆
1, a = 1) =
1
2
{ln(750) + ln(500)} = 6.415
Qt+1(s
⋆
1, a = 0) = ln (516.25) = 6.246
Since Qt+1(s
⋆
1, a = 1) > Qt+1(s
⋆
1, a = 0), the future optimal policy is ‘No Deal’ under s
⋆
1.
Qt+1(s
⋆
2, a = 1) =
1
2
{ln(750) + ln(25)} = 4.9194
Qt+1(s
⋆
2, a = 0) = ln (278.75) = 5.63
Since Qt+1(s
⋆
2, a = 1) < Qt+1(s
⋆
2, a = 0), the future optimal policy is ‘Deal’ under s
⋆
2.
Qt+1(s
⋆
3, a = 1) =
1
2
{ln(500) + ln(25)} = 4.716
Qt+1(s
⋆
3, a = 0) = ln (190) = 5.247
Since Qt+1(s
⋆
3, a = 1) < Qt+1(s
⋆
3, a = 0), the future optimal policy is ‘Deal’ under s
⋆
3.
Now, solving for Q-values at the previous step gives
Qt(s, a = 1) =
∑
s⋆∈S⋆
P (s⋆|s, a = 1)max
a∈A
Qt+1(s
⋆, a)
=
1
3
(6.415 + 5.63 + 5.247) = 5.764
with a monetary equivalent of exp(5.764) = 318.62. This is the continuation value (or ‘No
Deal’ decision value) at the current time period t. We can compare this with the ‘Deal’
decision value:
Qt(s, a = 0) = u(B(s = {750, 500, 25}))
= ln (0.305 · 750 + 0.5 · 25)
= ln(241.25) = 5.48
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The Banker then offers the contestant a monetary value of 241.25. Now, comparing the
Q-values of the decisions gives the optimal action of a⋆ = 1, ‘No Deal’ as
Qt(s, a = 1) = 5.7079 > 5.48 = Qt(s, a = 0)
We get this result because the continuation value is large. Essentially we are considering
the difference between $241 compared to $319, or a 33% premium.
To extend this analysis to include higher levels of risk aversion we consider can power
utility:
u(x) =
x1−γ − 1
1− γ
where γ = −u′′(x)/u(x) is a local measure of risk aversion, first introduced by de Finetti
(1952). We note that as γ tends to 1, the utility function above tends toward the afore-
mentioned logarithmic utility function. Therefore, the logarithmic utility function is just a
special case of the more general power utility function.
With the same three prize values remaining: s = {750, 500, 25} and an the expected
value criterion for the banker’s function, we get utilities:
u(B(s = {750, 500, 25})) =
(1275/3)1−γ − 1
1− γ
Therefore, the utility of ‘Deal’ is Qt(s, a = 0) =
(425)1−γ−1
1−γ
.
As before, we consider the continuation problem (‘No Deal’) of the set S⋆ = {s⋆1, s
⋆
2, s
⋆
3}
with expected value banker offers leading to the values 625, 387.5, and 137.5, respectively.
Performing the Q-value calculation gives:
Qt(s, a = 1) =
∑
s⋆∈S⋆
P (s⋆|s, a = 1)max
a∈A
Qt+1(s
⋆, a)
=
1
3
(
(625)1−γ − 1
1− γ
+
(387.5)1−γ − 1
1− γ
+
(262.5)1−γ − 1
1− γ
)
=
(625)1−γ + (387.5)1−γ + (262.5)1−γ − 3
3(1− γ)
with immediate utility u(s, a) = 0.
Hence, as the inequality Qt(s, a = 1) < Qt(s, a = 0) holds for all levels of risk aversion
0 < γ < ∞, the optimal action is a⋆ = 0, ‘Deal’. Once again, we can see that the
continuation value was not large enough to overcome the generous (expected value) offer
by the banker.
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2.5 Sensitivity Analysis - Different Banker’s Function
Now, using the Banker’s bidding function from the website, we once again have:
B(s) = 0.355 · big + 0.5 · small (with two prizes remaining)
From the previous section, we found that B(s⋆1) = 516.25, B(s
⋆
2) = 278.75, and B(s
⋆
3) = 190.
We now consider the optimal action with 2 prize values left for the player. To do so,
we calculate the following Q-values:
Qt+1(s
⋆
1, a = 1) =
1
2
(
7501−γ − 1
1− γ
+
5001−γ − 1
1− γ
)
=
7501−γ + 5001−γ − 2
2(1− γ)
Qt+1(s
⋆
1, a = 0) =
516.251−γ − 1
1− γ
Since Qt+1(s
⋆
1, a = 1) > Qt+1(s
⋆
1, a = 0) for all levels of risk aversion 0 < γ <∞, the future
optimal policy is ‘No Deal’ under s⋆1.
Qt+1(s
⋆
2, a = 1) =
1
2
(
7501−γ − 1
1− γ
+
251−γ − 1
1− γ
)
=
7501−γ + 251−γ − 2
2(1− γ)
Qt+1(s
⋆
2, a = 0) =
278.751−γ − 1
1− γ
Here, for 0 < γ < 0.5602, we find that Qt+1(s
⋆
2, a = 1) > Qt+1(s
⋆
2, a = 0) (so the optimal
future policy is ‘No Deal’ under s⋆2). On the other hand, for 0.5602 < γ <∞, we find that
Qt+1(s
⋆
2, a = 1) < Qt+1(s
⋆
2, a = 0) (so the future optimal policy is ‘Deal’ under s
⋆
2).
Qt+1(s
⋆
3, a = 1) =
1
2
(
5001−γ − 1
1− γ
+
251−γ − 1
1− γ
)
=
5001−γ + 251−γ − 2
2(1− γ)
Qt+1(s
⋆
3, a = 0) =
1901−γ − 1
1− γ
Here, for 0 < γ < 0.5175, we find that Qt+1(s
⋆
3, a = 1) > Qt+1(s
⋆
3, a = 0) (so the optimal
future policy is ‘No Deal’ under s⋆3). On the other hand, for 0.5175 < γ <∞, we find that
Qt+1(s
⋆
3, a = 1) < Qt+1(s
⋆
3, a = 0) (so the future optimal policy is ‘Deal’ under s
⋆
3).
Solving for the Q-values at the previous step gives
Qt(s, a = 1) =
∑
s⋆∈S⋆
P (s⋆|s, a = 1)max
a∈A
Qt+1(s
⋆, a)
=


1
3
(
7501−γ+5001−γ−2
2(1−γ)
+ 750
1−γ+251−γ−2
2(1−γ)
+ 500
1−γ+251−γ−2
2(1−γ)
)
if 0 < γ < 0.5175
1
3
(
7501−γ+5001−γ−2
2(1−γ)
+ 750
1−γ+251−γ−2
2(1−γ)
+ 190
1−γ
−1
1−γ
)
if 0.5175 < γ < 0.5602
1
3
(
7501−γ+5001−γ−2
2(1−γ)
+ 278.75
1−γ
−1
1−γ
+ 190
1−γ
−1
1−γ
)
if 0.5602 < γ <∞
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From this, we can calculate the following monetary equivalents:
((1− γ)Qt(s, a = 1) + 1)
1
1−γ =


(
7501−γ+5001−γ+251−γ
3
) 1
1−γ
if 0 < γ < 0.5175(
2(7501−γ+1901−γ )+5001−γ+251−γ
6
) 1
1−γ
if 0.5175 < γ < 0.5602(
2(278.751−γ+1901−γ )+7501−γ+5001−γ
6
) 1
1−γ
if 0.5602 < γ <∞
These are the continuation values (or ‘No Deal’ decision values) at the current time period.
We can compare these with the ‘Deal’ decision value:
Qt(s, a = 0) = u(B(s = {750, 500, 25}))
=
(0.305 · 750 + 0.5 · 25)1−γ − 1
1− γ
=
(241.25)1−γ − 1
1− γ
Hence, the Banker offers the contestant a monetary value of 241.25. Now, comparing the
Q-values of the decisions:
• Qt(s, a = 1) > Qt(s, a = 0) if 0 < γ < 4.5963 with optimal action a
⋆ = 1, ‘No Deal’.
• Qt(s, a = 0) > Qt(s, a = 1) if 4.5963 < γ <∞ with optimal action a
⋆ = 0, ‘Deal’.
Therefore, we can see that for most risk aversion levels (except for really high values),
the optimal action will be to choose ‘No Deal’. This is because the continuation value is
high relative to the value of the banker’s offer. Once again, for common risk aversion levels,
we can approximately reduce the Q-Learning results to a simple rule of thumb. That is,
continue as long as there are two large prizes left.
3 Analyzing Risky Choices: Suzanne and Frank
A number of authors have argued that backwards induction appears most relevant in the
early rounds of the game and that there is no difference with the myopic rule as the Banker’s
offers (near expected value) lead risk averse players to proceed. Our approach has shown
that there is a significant continuation value at the end of the game. Take for example,
a set of three prizes containing two large ones. Risk averse people will naively choose the
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action ‘Deal’, when if they incorporated the continuation value, they would choose ‘No
Deal’. Of course, this is sensitive to the banker’s offer function. If risk aversion is very
high as manifested by the contestant’s utility function, then the continuation value may
not always be high.
Post et al (2008) proposes that path-dependence factors heavily into the choices of
contestants, and in fact the choices can be explained by varying levels of risk aversion as
the game progresses favorably or unfavorably for the contestant. We find that this does
not have to necessarily be the case since choosing to turn down a Banker’s offer does not
have to imply decreasing risk aversion, but only a higher continuation value present by
removing the myopia restriction/assumption on the contestants.
As well, as the game progresses, we generally see that we can place increasingly restric-
tive upper bounds on the risk aversion coefficient γ. This can be done whenever we observe
a contestant choose the action ‘No Deal’. However, since we cannot place a lower bound
on this parameter γ until we observe a contestant choose the action ‘Deal’, we cannot nec-
essarily infer that the risk aversion level of a player is decreasing. This is because at the
point that the action ‘Deal’ is taken, the game immediately ends. Therefore, we cannot
observe a future action choice which requires a lower γ parameter.
We now use the examples of the real German contestant Susanne, as well as the Dutch
contestant Frank (both from Post) to illustrate our concept.
3.1 Example - Suzanne from Germany
We start by analyzing Susanne’s four remaining prizes {0.5, 1,000, 100,000, 150,000} at in
round 7. We let t = 7 and work backwards from the final stage, time t+ 2 = 9, where two
prizes remain. Hence, we evaluate all possible outcomes from the current state at time t in
order to determine Q-values for this current state.
First, we consider the expected banker’s offers for all of the possible outcomes at t+ 2.
Since for Susanne, we can only observe the Banker’s offer for a single outcome, we use
the observed percent of expected value of the given offer as a multiplier on the expected
value of all other potential outcomes. For time t + 2, this is mt+2 = 100%. Using this, we
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calculate the banker’s function for all other possible outcomes:
B(s∗t+2,1 = {0.5, 1,000}) = mt+2 ∗ s¯
∗
t+2,1 = 500.25
B(s∗t+2,2 = {0.5, 100,000}) = mt+2 ∗ s¯
∗
t+2,2 = 50,000.25
B(s∗t+2,3 = {0.5, 150,000}) = mt+2 ∗ s¯
∗
t+2,3 = 75,000.25
B(s∗t+2,4 = {1,000, 100,000}) = mt+2 ∗ s¯
∗
t+2,4 = 50,500
B(s∗t+2,5 = {1,000, 150,000}) = mt+2 ∗ s¯
∗
t+2,5 = 75,500
B(s∗t+2,6 = {100,000, 150,000}) = mt+2 ∗ s¯
∗
t+2,6 = 125,000
Therefore, we get the following Q-values for the decisions at+2,i = 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}: namely
Qt+2
(
s⋆t+2,j
)
for any j ∈ {1, . . . , 6}, by plugging into the power utility function.
Similarly, we can work out the Q-values for the decisions at+2,i = 1, i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. For
simplicity of notation we define Qt(i, j) = Qt(s
∗
t,i, at,i = j).
Qt+2(1, 1) =
1
2
(
0.51−γ − 1
1− γ
+
1,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
)
Qt+2(2, 1) =
1
2
(
0.51−γ − 1
1− γ
+
100,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
)
Qt+2(3, 1) =
1
2
(
0.51−γ − 1
1− γ
+
150,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
)
Qt+2(4, 1) =
1
2
(
1,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
+
100,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
)
Qt+2(5, 1) =
1
2
(
1,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
+
150,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
)
Qt+2(6, 1) =
1
2
(
100,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
+
150,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
)
Comparing these Q-values at t + 2, we can determine the optimal actions at each of the
possible states. That is, choose at+2,i = 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , 6} since
Qt+2(i, 0) > Qt+2(i, 1)
Now, we consider the expected banker’s offers at each of the possible states at time t + 1.
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Here we use an expected value multiplier of mt+1 = 90%:
B(s∗t+1,1 = {0.5, 1,000, 100,000}) = mt+1 ∗ s¯
∗
t+1,1 = 30,300.2
B(s∗t+1,2 = {0.5, 1,000, 150,000}) = mt+1 ∗ s¯
∗
t+1,2 = 45,300.2
B(s∗t+1,3 = {0.5, 100,000, 150,000}) = mt+1 ∗ s¯
∗
t+1,3 = 75,000.2
B(s∗t+1,4 = {1,000, 100,000, 150,000}) = mt+1 ∗ s¯
∗
t+1,4 = 75,300
Using these, we get the following Q-values for the decisions at+1,i = 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}:
Qt+1(1, 0) =
30,300.21−γ − 1
1− γ
, Qt+1(2, 0) =
45,300.21−γ − 1
1− γ
Qt+1(3, 0) =
75,000.21−γ − 1
1− γ
, Qt+1(4, 0) =
75,3001−γ − 1
1− γ
Using the optimal actions at t+2, we can calculate the continuation Q-values at t+1, that
is where at+1,i = 1, i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}:
Qt+1(1, 1) =
1
3
(
500.251−γ − 1
1− γ
+
50,000.251−γ − 1
1− γ
+
50,5001−γ − 1
1− γ
)
Qt+1(2, 1) =
1
3
(
500.251−γ − 1
1− γ
+
75,000.251−γ − 1
1− γ
+
75,5001−γ − 1
1− γ
)
Qt+1(3, 1) =
1
3
(
50,000.251−γ − 1
1− γ
+
75,000.251−γ − 1
1− γ
+
125,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
)
Qt+1(4, 1) =
1
3
(
50,5001−γ − 1
1− γ
+
75,5001−γ − 1
1− γ
+
125,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
)
Thus, we can see that:
Qt+1(1, 0) < Qt+1(1, 1) if γ < 0.22617 , Qt+1(2, 0) < Qt+1(2, 1) if γ < 0.22077
Qt+1(3, 0) < Qt+1(3, 1) if γ < 1.50645 , Qt+1(4, 0) < Qt+1(4, 1) if γ < 1.54085
Since we observe that Suzanne, when faced with s∗t+1,4, chose action at+1,4 = 1, we must
have that her γ < 1.54085.
Finally, we can now consider the banker’s offer at the current state at time t. Here, we
see that the expected value multiplier is mt = 73.31%:
B(s∗t = {0.5, 1,000, 100,000, 150,000}) = mt ∗ s¯
∗
t = 46,000
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Therefore, we get the following Q-value for the decision at = 0:
Qt(s
∗
t , at = 0) =
46,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
Using the optimal actions at t+1, we calculate the continuation Q-values at t, with at = 1
and determine
Qt(s
∗
t , at = 1) =


1
4
[Qt+1(1, 1) +Qt+1(2, 1) +Qt+1(3, 1) +Qt+1(4, 1)] if γ < 0.22077
1
4
[Qt+1(1, 1) +Qt+1(2, 0) +Qt+1(3, 1) +Qt+1(4, 1)] if 0.22077 < γ < 0.22617
1
4
[Qt+1(1, 0) +Qt+1(2, 0) +Qt+1(3, 1) +Qt+1(4, 1)] if 0.22617 < γ < 1.50645
1
4
[Qt+1(1, 0) +Qt+1(2, 0) +Qt+1(3, 0) +Qt+1(4, 1)] if 1.50645 < γ < 1.54085
where Qt(i, j) = Qt(s
⋆
t,i, at,i = j).
Using our optimal choice of at+1 for a given value of γ we have:
• If γ < 0.22077, then Qt(s
∗
t , at = 0) < Qt(s
∗
t , at = 1) for γ < 0.68666.
• If 0.22077 < γ < 0.22617, then Qt(s
∗
t , at = 0) < Qt(s
∗
t , at = 1) for γ < 0.87506.
• If 0.22617 < γ < 1.50645, then Qt(s
∗
t , at = 0) < Qt(s
∗
t , at = 1) for γ < 2.61618.
• If 1.50645 < γ < 1.54085, then Qt(s
∗
t , at = 0) < Qt(s
∗
t , at = 1) for γ < 2.73117.
Therefore, for γ < 1.54085 the optimal decision at time t is at = 1, ‘No Deal’, since the
continuation value is the larger. This is consistent with the choice that Susanne made.
Now, we can plot the evolving monetary values of each action a at each point in time.
In figure 1, the solid line represents the value of the Banker’s offer (a = 0), and the four
dotted lines represent the continuation value (a = 1) for a range of ascending values of the
risk aversion parameter γ. At each point in time, the contestant will choose the action with
the larger value. Therefore, we see that Susanne will prefer action at+1 = 1 at time t + 1
if her risk aversion parameter is γ < 1.54085. However, at time t + 2, all values of γ > 0
will induce the optimal action at+2 = 0 since the value of the Banker’s offer is larger than
all possible continuation values. Naturally, at time t + 3, where the contestant holds only
one case, there is complete certainty about the prize value, therefore (for completeness) the
Banker’s offer has converged to the value of that prize.
Also, it is important to note that although we have only considered the final stages
of Susanne’s game, it is unlikely that an earlier stage has placed a more restrictive upper
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bound on the risk aversion parameter. Since the Banker’s offer as a percentage of expected
value is increasing over time, choosing the action ‘Deal’ early on in the game becomes very
unattractive. Only a contestant with a very large risk aversion level will choose ‘Deal’
early and forgo the almost certain increasing percentage of expected value implicit in the
Banker’s offer function.
t t+1 t+2 t+3
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γ=1.54085
Figure 1: Susanne’s evolving values of the two actions for varying levels of risk aversion
Thus, we can see that given a constant risk aversion level of γ < 1.54085, it is possible
to rationally observe the actions of the real player, Susanne, except for the final time period
t+2. Seemingly, only a completely risk-neutral or even risk-seeking player would be willing
to turn down an expected value offer in exchange for a fair gamble on a set of prizes as per
Jensen’s Inequality. However, we have observed Susanne turning down an offer of 125,000
for a 50/50 gamble on the set of prizes {100,000, 150,000}. What could cause her to do so
while allowing us to not deviate from the constant risk aversion level hypothesis?
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3.2 Example - Frank from the Netherlands
Consider Frank’s four remaining prizes {0.50, 10, 20, 10,000} in round t = 7. As he plays
through his remaining rounds, Frank is presented with the following remaining prizes at
each period:
st = {0.5, 10, 20, 10,000}, st+1 = {10, 20, 10,000}, st+2 = {10, 10,000}, st+3 = {10}
At each one of these periods, we observe the following Banker’s offers and implied m values:
B(st) = 2,400 = mt ∗ s¯t = mt ∗ 2507.63 ⇒ mt = 95.71%
B(st+1) = 3,500 = mt+1 ∗ s¯t+1 = mt+1 ∗ 3343.33 ⇒ mt+1 = 104.69%
B(st+2) = 6,000 = mt+2 ∗ s¯t+2 = mt+2 ∗ 5005.00 ⇒ mt+2 = 119.88%
Interestingly, the Banker’s offer percentage is very high with respect to expected value. In
fact, the final two offers are significantly above expected value.
At time period t+ 2 we can see that Frank turns down the offer of 6,000 for the 50/50
gamble between 10 and 10,000. Short of Frank being risk averse and acting completely
irrationally, there are two possible explanations for this observed action. Either he truly
has a risk aversion level characterized by γ < 0 (i.e. he is risk seeking), or he has a large
“enjoyment” benefit from playing the game (i.e. his b is quite large). It is possible that
if he has a large enough value of b, that his choice of ‘No Deal’ at time t + 2 is not risk
seeking, but actually risk averse!
As an additional point, looking at his decision at time t+1, we can see that even though
Frank turns down a Banker offer larger than the expected value, this choice may not have
been risk seeking even if he has an “enjoyment” benefit of b = 0! To see this, consider
the continuation value: if Frank expects that the Banker’s expected value offer percentage
m is increasing in each round, he may get an even larger Banker’s expected value offer
percentage m in the next round. Therefore, even if the m value in one round is larger than
100%, an observed action of ‘No Deal’ does not preclude risk aversion if an even larger m
value is expected in the next period. Plainly, this is caused by a large continuation value.
Similarly as we did for Susanne, figure 2 shows the evolving monetary values of each
action a at every point in time.
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Figure 2: Frank’s evolving values of the two actions for varying levels of risk aversion
3.3 The terminal risk-seeking choice
One interesting feature of Suzanne’s and Frank’s choices are their risk seeking behaviour
at the terminal decision. Clearly, there is no continuation value left in the game. How
irrational are these decisions? They are gaining enjoyment from other sources such as:
enthusiasm from playing the game, audience encouragement, and even excitement from
being on TV. If we assume that the marginal enjoyment benefit is positive at each further
stage of the game since a player would likely prefer to play the game longer than shorter. If
we let the marginal benefit to Susanne to play the final round of the game to be the value
b, we then have the following condition to turn down the Banker’s final offer:
125,0001−γ − 1
1− γ
≤
1
2
[
(100,000 + b)1−γ − 1
1− γ
+
(150,000 + b)1−γ − 1
1− γ
]
γ = 1.54085 ⇒ b = 3,761.90
Therefore, we can see that even at the highest possible risk aversion level of γ = 1.54085,
Susanne only needs an “enjoyment” benefit of e3,761.90 in order to justify her ‘No Deal’
choice.
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4 Discussion
The TV game show Deal or No Deal is well suited for analyzing risky choices. The stakes
are high and the outcomes for the contestants can range from a multi-mullion payday
to empty-handed. The game involves only binary decisions and there are no subjective
probabilities as the odds are well-defined ahead of time. We show, however, that the
sequential nature of the game induces a significant continuation value that has been missed
by a number of researchers. Choices can appear irrational and risky when in fact they are
just an optimal strategy with reasonable (constant) parameters for risk aversion in a simple
CRRA model of utility and choice.
Our approach uses Q-learning, a popular technique in the reinforcement learning lit-
erature, to solve for the optimal strategy. We then show that choices provide bounds on
risk aversion parameters conditional on optimal play. We analyze the Frank and Suzanne
data-sets from Post et al (2008) which tests the Thaler and Johnson (1990) hypothesis that
many choices are affected by past outcomes. While Post et al (2008) conclude that many
of the choices are the effect of time-varying risk aversion, our empirical findings are more
in line with Bombardini and Trebbi (2007) who propose a dynamic expected utility model
for the Italian version of the game and conclude that contestants have constant levels of
risk aversion but players are extremely heterogeneous in their beliefs.
We note that the idea of time-varying risk aversion has been captured in the economics
and finance literature in a number of ways. A common approach is via habit formation
as shown by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Brandt and Wang (2011). Nevertheless,
this seems unrealistic in such a short lived game. Other interesting utility functions –
where Q-learning can easily be applied – are prospect theory which predicts possible time
inconsistencies in gambling attitudes as discussed by Barberis (2011) or recursive utility
methods as proposed in Kreps and Porteus (1978). We emphasize here that the neo-classical
constant relative risk aversion model provides a realistic model for the contestants’ attitudes
studied here except for their final risk seeking choices.
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Table 1: Susanne’s Choices
Prize 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
e0.01 × × × ×
e0.20 × × ×
e0.50 × × × × × × ×
e1
e5
e10
e20 × ×
e50 × ×
e100 × × × ×
e200
e300 × × ×
e400 ×
e500
e1,000 × × × × × × × ×
e2,500 × × × × × ×
e5,000 ×
e7,500
e10,000 × ×
e12,500 × × ×
e15,000 ×
e20,000 × ×
e25,000 × × × × ×
e50,000 ×
e100,000 × × × × × × × × ×
e150,000 × × × × × × × × ×
e250,000 ×
Average e 32,094 21,431 26,491 34,825 46,417 50,700 62,750 83,667 125,000
Offer e 3,400 4,350 10,000 15,600 25,000 31,400 46,000 75,300 125,000
Offer % 11% 20% 38% 45% 54% 62% 73% 90% 100%
Decision No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal
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Table 2: Frank’s Choices
Prize 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
e0.01 × ×
e0.20 × ×
e0.50 × × × × × × ×
e1 × × × × ×
e5
e10 × × × × × × × × ×
e20 × × × × × × × ×
e50
e100
e500
e1,000 ×
e2,500 × × ×
e5,000 × ×
e7,500
e10,000 × × × × × × × × ×
e25,000 × ×
e50,000 × × × ×
e75,000 × × ×
e100,000 × × ×
e200,000 × × × ×
e300,000 ×
e400,000 ×
e500,000 × × × × × ×
e1,000,000 ×
e2,500,000
e5,000,000 ×
Average e 383,427 64,502 85,230 95,004 85,005 102,006 2,508 3,343 5,005
Offer e 17,000 8,000 23,000 44,000 52,000 75,000 2,400 3,500 6,000
Offer % 4% 12% 27% 46% 61% 74% 96% 105% 120%
Decision No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal No Deal
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